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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
a 
* 
t 
e 
The purpose of the work performed under this grant is to begin to obtain information about 
the efficacy of fault-tolerant software by conducting two large-scale controlled experiments. In 
the first, an empirical study of multi-version software is being conducted. This experiment will 
be referred to as the “MVS” experiment in this report. The second experiment is an empirical 
evaluation of self testing as a method of error detection and will be referred to as the “STED” 
experiment. 
The M V S  experiment is being conducted jointly by NASA, four universities, and Charles 
River Analytics, Inc. The participating universities are North Carolina State University, the 
University of California at Los Angles, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the 
University of Virginia. During the current grant reporting period, the work at the University of 
Virginia in the MVS experiment has centered around the preparation of an environment for 
testing the subject programs and the performance of a set of preliminary tests. Other elements of 
the experiment are being carried out at the other sites. 
The purpose of the MVS experiment is to obtain empirical measurements of the 
performance of multi-version systems. Twenty versions of a program have been prepared at four 
different sites (the universities) under reasonably realistic development conditions from the same 
specifications. The experimenters are now preparing to evaluate these programs in various ways, 
in particular by extensive dynamic testing. 
The STED experiment is being conducted jointly by the University of Virginia and the 
University of California, Irvine. The purpose of the STED experiment is to obtain empirical 
measurements of the performance of assertions in error detection. Eight versions of a program 
have been modified to include assertions at two different universities under controlled conditions. 
During the grant reporting period, the experiment has been designed, the various programs 
enhanced with self checks, and the resulting error detection performance measured. The 
preliminary results of the experiment have been written up as a conference paper. 
In this report, we describe the overall structure of the testing environment for the MVS 
experiment and its status in section 11. In section 111, we describe a preliminary version of the 
control system that has been implemented for the M V S  experiment to allow the experimenter to 
have control over the details of the testing. We summarize our work in the STED experiment in 
section IV. The paper describing the S E D  experiment is included as Appendix A. In Appendix 
B, we present the results of the preliminary testing of the programs generated in the MVS 
experiment. 
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SECTION I1 
MULTI-VERSION SOFTWARE TEST ENVIRONMENT STRUCTURE 
The basic layout of the test environment was decided at joint meeting of the research 
members held in Boston in April, 1986. This basic layout has been extended in various ways as a 
result of numerous discussion and changes in requirements. A fundamental goal of the 
environment is to be as independent of the machine used for the testing as possible. Thus, 
although built and distributed as a UNIX based system, the environment should run on other 
machines with little change. 
The philosophy of the test system is to allow the experimenter to specify the initial 
conditions and sensor failure requirements for a single simulated flight and then to generate a 
series of acceleration values that are supplied to the programs along with the initial and failure 
conditions. This is intended to simulate a single flight of an aircraft. 
The system allows the experimenter to specify that several (perhaps many) flights are 
required each with a different (but perhaps similar or related) set of initial conditions. For 
example, some parameter might have to be varied systematically over some range. In this case, 
the system will create a sequence of initial conditions in which the required parameter is varied 
bJt the same set cf acceleration and Euler angles is used for each simulated flight in the set. The 
systematic variation and the reexecution of the programs on the set of accelerations is handled by 
the execution environment. 
The environment consists of a set of programs that are organized into five tiers or levels. 
The general form is shown in figure 1. The interfaces between the levels are precisely defined. 
Each consists of character files thereby permitting the greatest degree of machine independence. 
The details of the interfaces are referred to here as formats. For example, format 0 describes the 
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Fig. 1 - Overall Environment Layout 
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interface between tier-0 and tier-1, and consists of a single explicitly named file. Other formats 
use more than one file, including in most case the standard input and standard output files. 
Figures 2,3,4 and 5 show the input and output details for each tier individually. In these figures, 
a dashed line represents either standard in or standard out, and a solid line connected to a named 
ellipse indicates an explicit disk file. The exact content of the formats is described in the section 
111. 
Tier-0 
The purpose of the single program in tier-0 is to interact with the experimenter to determine 
the parameters of the tests that have to be run. This program produces a file of data for control of 
subsequent programs after gathering the details of the required tests from the experimenter. The 
program makes no decisions and generates no data itself (except defaults) so the output datafile 
contains everything that the experimenter supplied. For simple tests, most parameters can take 
the default values allowing the definition of the tests to be created with very little input from the 
experimenter. 
Terminal I: 
Fig. 2 - Input And Output For Tier-0 
e 
0 
e 
W 
Optionally, an existing parameter file can be read by the program to provide a set of initial 
conditions for the interaction with the experimenter. Thus if two sets of tests are to be run with 
minimal change between runs, the data file from one can be read in to set values initially for the 
experimenter during the interaction. A second data file that differs little from the first can the be 
generated merely by indicating the changes. 
As will be seen from the discussion in section 111, the interaction camed out by the tier-0 
program could result in the specification of a large number of tests. The number is computed and 
supplied to the experimenter for confirmation. 
The tier-0 program is written in Pascal. Although it is interactive, the program operates in a 
very simple menu style to ensure independence of terminal characteristics, 
Tier-1 
The programs in tier-1 obtain the specifications for the initial conditions from the file that 
the tier-0 program creates. They then generate the series of accelerations and angles that is 
required for the specified test flight(s). 
There are three programs in tier-1. Each operates with the same input and output interfaces 
(formats 0 and 1). and as far as the rest of the environment is concerned, they are equivalent. The 
first generates a series of accelerations from a trace file. It merely reads accelerations obtained 
from measurement on the B737 aircraft and converts them to the format required by the 
following tier. This program is written in Pascal. 
The second program generates accelerations and angles randomly. Although these values 
are unrcalistic, they are adequate for testing. This program is written in Pascal. 
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Fig. 3 - Input And Output For Tier-1 
The third program is an aircraft simulator that generates realistic values for the required 
data. This program is being prepared by Charles River Analytics. It is written in FORTRAN. 
There is a single program in tier-2, the sensor simulator. This program is written in 
FORTRAN and the original version was supplied by Charles River Analytics. This program has 
been modified by the University of Virginia to include the necessary loops for driving the 
following tiers where parameters are being varied in a series of simulated flights. The program 
takes an acceleration value and other parameters supplied from the data file generated by the 
tier-0 program and generates the corresponding sensor values. 
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Fig. 4 - Input And Output For Tier-2 
Tier-3 
Tier-3 contains the actual versions under test, several driver programs, and a utility 
program. It was deemed inadvisable to attempt to run all 20 versions together with a single 
driver. Merely compiling a major program of that size would take considerable resources. We 
have found that several Pascal compilers available to us were unable to compile such a program. 
To avoid these problems, tier-3 contains four drivers, one for each university. They read 
the same inputs but create their own output files and so can be run in parallel. A utility program 
(the combiner) is then used to combine the output files so that they appear to have come from a 
driver that executed all twenty programs together. The combiner merely reorganizes the output 
files of the four drivers. It makes no content changes to the data. 
Flight Test Cases 
Results 
Combiner 
Fig. 5 - Input And Output For Tier-3 
The tier-3 drivers keep the initial conditions for a particular flight as global data while 
executing the required versions. This data includes the calibration data. Thus although each 
program thinks that it will operate on a single flight acceleration value, the calibration and other 
parametric information is identical for each acceleration for a flight and so the effect is to have 
the program do calibration followed by a series of acceleration values. 
Tier-4 
Tier4 consists of an arbitrary number of “filter” programs that read the output of tier-3 and 
do useful things with the output. As new functions are required, new filters will be added. 
Present filters include programs to allow formatted printing of the raw test results in various 
forms. Filters are being developed to allow the raw data produced by the tests to be stored in as 
compact a form as possible on tape. The purpose of these filters is to allow tests to be run and 
their entire output to be saved for later analysis. This will permit tests to be performed without 
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all possible analyses being performed at the same time. 
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SECTION I11 
MULTI-VERSION SOFTWARE TEST ENVIRONMENT FORMATS 
In this section the detailed contents of the interface formats are discussed. 
Previously, the set-up for testing the RSDIMU versions allowed only minimal control over 
the generation of the input variables. Consequently, it was not possible to study the effects of 
gradually changing the values of such variables without repeatedly recompiling the test 
programs, which would be, of course, senseless. What follows describes the means used to give 
the experimenter greater control over generation of input values to the versions in the present 
environment. With such control the effects of each RSDIMU input variable can be studied 
individually or in combination with other selected input variables in whatever ways might be 
deemed desirable during the course of the testing. 
Each set of input variables, as generated by this control information, is interpreted as a set 
of initial conditions. Given this set of initial conditions, a series of testcases is generated, each 
with a different acceleration value and set of vehicle frame Euler angles. The number of 
acceleration values used is given by a control parameter. Within the series of testcases, sensor 
failure also is simulated as specified by the control information. By keeping the same set of 
initial conditions for a sequence of acceleration values, the calibration data is kept the same, and 
the resulting effect is that of performing one calibration of the sensors and then saving that 
information to be used while performing a series of in flight sensor readings and sets of 
calculations. In this manner, the capability is achieved for what is hoped to be a reasonable 
simulation of “flight”, with successive sensor rcadings taken over a period of time. 
0 
0 
0 
Sensors are failed on each specified testcase according to their control values (see below). 
The test drivers in tier-3 have been modified so that for each two consecutive acceleration value 
and angle sets with the same set of initial conditions, the values for linfailin input to each version 
are the values for linfailout computed by that version on the previous acceleration and angle set. 
In this way the various responses of the versions to sensor failure can be studied over a sequence 
of acceleration values. 
The variables that can be controlled are as follows: 
liistd 
linfailin 
rawlin 
dmode 
temp 
scale0, 
scale1 , 
scale2 
misalign 
nsigt 
phii, 
thetai, 
psii 
: noise standard deviation for accelerometers 
: accelerometer failure initial conditions 
: raw sensor data for acceleration computation 
: display mode 
: current temperature on each face 
: linear accelerometer slope coefficients 
: accelerometer misalignment angles 
: noise tolerance 
: Euler angles for rotation from the vehicle frame to the 
instrument frame 
Rawlin cannot be controlled directly, as it must be generated by the sensor simulator based on the 
acceleration, Euler angle, and misalignment angle values. However, whether its value for a given 
sensor should reflect failure during calibration or failure during flight can be controlled directly, 
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and so can the value for noise which is used in generating the rawlin value for a sensor which is 
to be found noisy by the RSDIMU versions. Offraw, the calibration data for the eight 
accelerometers, can also be indirectly controlled in similar ways, but that control is being left for 
a later modification of the test control. 
For all of the variables above, except for linfailin, misalign, scale0, scalel, scale2, and the 
sensor failure control information. there are defined three control modes: 
0 : to indicate that a value should be randomly-generated within a specified range, 
0 
D 
D 
1 : to indicate that the variable should be varied over a specified range while all other variables 
except the acceleration values are held constant, 
2 : to indicate that the variable should be set to a certain specified constant. 
For each of these variables the control information is contained on one line of standard 
input, with the formats as follows: 
for mode 0: 0 min max 
for mode 1: 1 lowerbound upperbound step 
for mode 2: 2 constant 
“Min” and “max” specify the range within which the value is to be randomly-generated. 
“Lowerbound” and “upperbound” specify the range over which the variable is to be varied for 
mode 1 and “step” specifies the increments by which it is to be varied. “Constant” is the 
specified value to which the variable is to be set when mode 2 is used. Min, max, lowerbound, 
upperbound, step, and constant will each be assumed to be of the same type as the RSDIMU input 
variable which they are being used to control. 
- 13 - 
0 
For linfailin and for the control information regarding which sensors will fail during 
calibration (equivalent to the output variable “linnoise”) the format is slightly different: 
for mode 0: 0 lowerbound upperbound 
for mode 1: 1 number 
for mode 2: 2 boo11 bool2 boo13 boo14 boo15 bo016 boo17 boo18 
Here the modes are defined as follows: 
e 
0 
0 
0 : specifies that a randomly-generated number of the eight values be set to true. This number 
will be between “lowerbound” and “upperbound” inclusive. Which of the sensor values 
are set will be randomly determined. 
1 : specifies that “number” of the eight values be set to true. Which of the sensor values are 
set will be randomly determined. 
2 : specifies that the eight values be set to the respective constant values, “booll” through 
‘ ‘bo018 ” 
“Number” is assumed to be an integer and “booll” through “bool8” will be assumed to be 
either 0’s or 1’s. with “1” representing true and “0” representing false. “Lowerbound” and 
“upperbound” will be assumed to be integers between 0 and 8 inclusive. 
For misalign, scale0, scalel, and scale2 the format is as follows: 
min max 
0 
In this case, since there is only one mode, mode numbers are unnecessary. That mode specifies 
that each of the 24 misalign values (or each of the 8 scaleX values) be randomly-generated 
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between the values “min” and “max”, which are assumed to be real numbers and which may be 
equal. 
In addition to the ability to control the values of RSDIMU input variables, it is desirable to 
have the ability to control which sensors fail during “flight” and during which iteration of sensor 
reading during the “flight” each sensor fails. To this end the following format is used: 
intl int2 int3 int4 int5 int6 int7 int8 
“Intl” through “int8” are integers which represent the sensor reading iteration during which 
sensors 1 through 8 respectively will fail. A value of 0 for “intX” indicates that sensor X will 
not fail during this test of the RSDIMU procedures. The non-zero values for “intl” through 
“int8” must be distinct from one another, as it is assumed in the RSDIMU specifications that at 
most one sensor will fail on a given sensor reading. The indicated sequence of sensor failures 
will be simulated once for each set of initial conditions (i.e. for each “flight”). Sensor failure 
simulation will be accomplished by modifying the generated value for rawlin in such a way that it 
will appear too noisy to be functional. The modifying value used will be the value for “noise” 
generated by its control information. Sensors are made to fail not only on the desired sensor 
reading, but also on all successive readings within a given “flight”, so that if a particular 
RSDIMU version fails to mark that sensor as having failed on that iteration, it may still do so on 
a subsequent iteration. The value for “intX” should not exceed the value for the number of 
acceleration values per “flight”. 
The known acceleration values and the values for phiv, thetav, and psiv are no longer 
obtained from standard input. Instead, the tier-1 programs write them to a temporary file named 
by the control parameter “AccelerationFileName” so that they can be used repeatedly (i.e. for 
each set of “initial conditions”). 
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These control formats have been implemented in such a way that, if two or more variables 
are being varied over ranges, testcases are generated for a l l  combinations of all the values over 
which each is being vaned, and at the same time conform to any control specifications for other 
variables. 
a 
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CONTROL INFO I Number of Acceleration Values for each flight 
BLOCK I Seedl, Seed2 for random numbers, tiers 1 and 2 
I Version Selection Vector (1 element per version, 1 selects 
I corresponding version for execution, 0 bypasses) 
I AccelerationFileName 
I control info for linstd 
I control info for linfailin 
I control info for number of sensors to fail in calibration 
I control info for sensor failure during flight 
I control info for noise 
I control info for dmode 
I control info for temp[l] 
I control info for temp[2] 
I control info for tempt31 
I control info for temp[4] 
I control info for scale0 
1 control info for scale1 
I control info for scale2 
I control info for misalign 
1 control info for nsigt 
I control info for phii 
I control info for thetai 
I control info for psii 
0 
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FILE FORMAT 1 (format for input to tier-2 programs): 
CONTROL INFO BLOCK (see above) 
+ a file containing Number-of-Acceleration-Values lines of 
VehicleAccel[x] VehicleAccel[y] VehicleAccel[z] phiv thetav psiv 
e 
e 
a 
a 
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CONTROL INFO BLOCK (see above) 
FLIGHT BLOCK (repeated once for each flight) 
I obase 
I offraw[l ,I] ... offraw[8,1] 
I .  
I -  
I -  
I offraw[l,50] ... offraw[8,50] 
I linstd 
I linfailin[l] ... linfailin[8] {encoded as integers 0..1} 
I dmode 
I temp[l] ... temp[4] 
I scaleO[l] ... scale0[8] 
I scalel [ l ]  ... scalel [8] 
I scale2[1] ... scale2[8] 
I misalign[l ,I] ... misalign[l,6] 
I misalign[2,1] ... misalign[2,6] 
I misalign[3,1] ... misalign[3,6] 
I misalign[4,1] ... misalign[4,6] 
I nsigt 
I phii 
I thetai 
I psii 
I ACCELERATION BLOCK (repeated once per accel value) 
I I rawlin[l] ... rawlin[8] 
I I normface[l] ... normface[4] 
I I phiv thetav psiv 
I I KnownBestest.acceleration[x] ... KnownBestest.acceleration[z] 
0 
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CONTROL INFO BLOCK (see ' above) 
The Following Repeated For Each Flight: 
I KnownBestest.accel[x] ... KnownBestest.accel[z] 
I The Following Repeated for Each Version Selected For Execution: 
I I linoffset[l] ... linoffset[8] 
I I linnoise[l] ... linnoise[8] {encoded booleans} 
I I linfailout[l] ... linfailout[8] {encoded booleans} 
I I linout[l] ... linout[8] 
I ldismode 
I I disupper[l] ... disupper[3] 
I I dislower[l] ... dislower[3] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I chanface[l] ... chanface[4] 
I I systatus {encoded boolean} 
I bestest.status bestest.acceleration[l] ... bestest.acceIeration[3] 
I chanest[l].status chanest[l].accel[l ] ... chanest[l].accel[3] 
I chanest[2].status chanest[2].accel[l] ... chanest[2].accel[3] 
I chanest[3].status chanest[3].accel[l] ... chanest[3].accel[3] 
I chanest[4].status chanest[4].accel[l] ... chanest[4].accel[3] 
e 
a 
e 
e 
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SECTION IV 
ERROR DETECTION BY SELF TEST EXPERIMENT 
In the second experiment, the empirical evaluation of self testing for e m r  detection, we are 
attempting to determine how well programmers can prepare assertions for the detection of 
execution-time errors. This study is empirical. 
From the set of twenty-seven programs written for the Knight and Leveson experiment [l], 
eight were chosen for modification. Each of these eight was supplied to three programmers who 
worked separately to add assertions to the programs. The effort expended by each programmer 
was one week. The experiment protocol was: 
(1) The program specification was supplied to the programmers and they were given a 
presentation describmg the goals of the experiment, the protocol, and the schedule. Each 
programmer was also supplied with a copy of the chapter on e m r  detection from the text by 
Anderson and Lee [2]. 
(4) 
0 
The programmers were required to study the specification and the text on error detection, 
and then to attempt to develop assertions based purely on knowledge of the specifications. 
When the specification-based assertions were complete, the programmers were supplied 
with the source text of the program they were to modify. The programs were then modified 
to include assertions. 
After the assertions had been added, the programmers were supplied with fifteen test cases 
that executed correctly prior to the addition of the modifications. These test cases should 
have executed correctly after the addition of the assertions. The programmers were 
-21 - 
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requested to test the modifications and assertions in any way they chose in addition to the 
fifteen test cases. 
Finally, the modified programs were subjected to the same set of acceptance tests that had 
been used in the original experiment [ 13. 
The programmers were asked to keep detailed logs of their effort during the time they were 
working on the project, and each was required to complete a background technical and 
educational questionnaire. 
Once all three copies of each of the eight programs had been prepared and accepted, the 
modified programs were tested using the same test driver and test cases that were used in the 
original experiment. The results of this testing and other malysis are presented in Appendix A. 
e 
0 
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APPENDIX A 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SOFTWARE ERROR DETECTION 
USING SELF-CHECKS 
S.D. Cha 
N.G. Leveson 
T.J. Shimeal 
University of California, b i n e  
J.C. Knight 
University of Virginia 
This paper to be presented at the Seventeenth International Symposium on Fault- 
Tolerant Computing ( F K S  17), Pittsburgh, PA. 
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Abstract 
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This paper presents the results of an empirical study of error detection using self-checks. A 
total of twenty-four graduate students in computer science at the University of Virginia and the 
University of California, Imine, were hired as programmers. Working independently, each first 
prepared a set of self-checks using just the specification for an application, and then each 
modified an existing implementation of the specification. The modified programs were analyzed 
to classify the various checks that the programmers wrote, and then tested to measure the emr -  
dctection performance of the checks. 
The goal of this study was not just to obtain quantitative results but to leam more about 
such checks and how they might best be implemented. This information may result in better 
methods for formulating checks, making them easier to write and more effective. The analysis of 
the checks revealed that there are great differences in the ability of individual programmers to 
design effective checks. We found that some checks that might have been effective failed to 
detect a fault because they were badly placed, and there were numerous instances of checks 
signaling non-existent emrs. In general, speci fication-based checks alone were not as effective 
as combining them with code-based checks. 
c 
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1. Goals of the Study 
Crucial digital systems can fail because of faults in either software or hardware. A great 
deal of research in hardware design has yielded computer architectures of potentially very high 
reliability, such as SIFT [Wensley (1978)l and FTMP [Hopkins (1978)l. In addition, distributed 
systems (incorporating fail-stop processors [Schlicting and Schneider (1983)l) can provide 
graceful degradation and safe operation even when individual computers fail or are physically 
damaged. 
The state of the art in software development is not as advanced. Current production 
methods do not yield software with the required reliability for crucial systems, and advanced 
methods of formal verification [Gries (198l)l and synthesis [Partsch and Steinbruggen (1983)l 
are not able to deal with software of the required size and complexity. Fault tolerance [Randell 
(1975)l has been proposed as a technique to allow software to cope with its own faults in a 
manner reminiscent of the techniques employed in hardware fault tolerance. Many detailed 
proposals have been made in the literature, but there is little empirical evidence to judge which 
techniques are most effective or even whether they can be applied successfully to real problems. 
This study is part of an on-going effort by the authors to collect and examine empirical data on 
software fault tolerance methods in order to focus hture research efforts and to allow decisions to 
be made about real projects. 
Previous studies by the authors have looked at N-version programming in terms of 
independence of failures [Knight and Leveson (1986a)], reliability improvement, and error 
detection [Knight and Leveson (1986b)l. Other empirical studies of N-version programming 
have been reported [Avizienis and Chen (1977). Gmeiner and Voges (1979). Avizienis and Kelly 
(1984), Scott et. al. (1984), Bishop et. 01. (1985), and Dunham (1986)l. .4 study by [Anderson et. 
al. (198S)l showed promise for recovery blocks but concluded that acceptance tests are difficult 
e 
0 
0 
to write. Acceptance tests are a subset of the more general run-time assertion or self-check used 
in exception handling and testing schemes. More information about the use of self-checks to 
detect software errors might result in better methods for formulating checks, making them easier 
to write and more effective. Our goal in this study was not merely to provide numerical data but 
to learn more about such checks and how they might best be implemented. 
In order to eliminate as many independent variables from the experiment as possible, it was 
decided to focus on error detection apart from other issues such as recovery. This also means that 
the results have implications beyond software fault tolerance alone, for example in the use of 
embedded assertions to detect software errors during testing [Stuck (1977)]. Furthermore, in 
some safety-critical systems (e.g., the Boeing 737-300 and the Airbus A310) error detection is the 
onZy objective. In these systems, software recovery is not attempted and, instead, a non-digital 
backup system such as an analog or human alternative is immediately given control in the event 
of a computer system failure. The results of this study may have immediate application in these 
areas. The next section describes the design of the study. Following this, the results are 
described and conclusions drawn. 
a 
2. Experimental Design 
(E 
0 
This study uses the programs developed for a previous experiment by [Knight and Leveson 
(1986a)l. Twenty-seven versions of a program to read radar data and determine whether an 
interceptor should be launched to shoot down the object (hereafter referred to as the Launch 
Interceptor Program, or LIP) were prepared from a common specification by graduate students 
and seniors at the University of Virginia and the University of California, Irvine. Extensive 
efforts were made to ensure that individual students did not cooperate or exchange information 
about their program dcsips during the development phase. The twenty-seven LIP programs 
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have been analyzed by running one million randomly generated test cases on each program and 
locating the individual faults that were detected during the testing procedure. 
In the present study, 8 students from UCI and 16 students from UVA were employed for a 
week’s time to instrument the programs with self-checking code in an attempt to detect errors in 
the programs. Eight programs were selected from the 27 and each was randomly assigned to 
three students (one from UCI and two from UVA). The students were all graduate students in 
computer science with an average of 2.35 years of graduate study. Professional experience ranged 
from 0 to 9 years with an average of 1.7 years. None of the participants had prior knowledge of 
the LIP program nor were they familiar with the results of the previous experiment. There was 
no significant correlation found between a participant’s graduate or industrial experience and 
their success at writing self-checks. 
Participants were provided with a brief explanation of the study along with an introduction 
to writing self-checks, AU also read Chapter 5 on Error Detection from a textbook on fault 
tolerance [Anderson and Lee (198l)l. The participants were first asked to study the LIP 
specification and to write checks using only the specification, the training materials, and any 
additional references the participants desired. When they had submitted their initial checks, they 
were randomly assigned a program to instrument. The participants were asked to write checks 
with and without looking at the code in order to determine if there was a difference in 
effectiveness between self-checks designed by a person working from the requirements alone and 
those for which the person has access to and information about the program code. On the one 
hand, the person working only from the requirements might provide more independence by not 
being influenced by the written code. However, it could also be argued that looking at the code 
will suggest different and perhaps better self-checks. Because we anticipated that the process of 
examining the code might result in the participants detecting faults through code-reading alone, 
participants were asked to report any such detected faults but to still attempt to write a self-check 
- 
0 
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The instrumented versions were subjected to an acceptance test (200 randomly generated 
test cases) as in the previous experiment. The original versions were known to run correctly on 
those data, and we wanted to attempt to remove obvious faults introduced by the self-checks. If 
any false alarms were raised (faults reported that did not actually exist) or if new faults were 
detected which had been introduced into the program by the instrumentation, the programs were 
returned to the participants for correction. Along with the instrumented version, participants 
submitted time sheets, background profile questionnaires, and descriptions of all program faults 
identified by code reading. 
After the instrumented programs had passed the acceptance test, they were executed using 
the test cases on which they had failed in the previous experiment along with 20,000 new 
randomly-generated test cases to see if new faults might have been detected. Finally, the self- 
checks were carefully examined and catalogued as to type of check and effectiveness. 
3. Results 
The first task of the experiment participants was to read through the program requirements 
specification and to design self-checks based solely on that specification. These self-checks were 
found to fall into four groups based on the general strategy of check used: 
[l] Duplication Checks: self-checks that duplicate the functionality of the code and compare 
results. Most, but not all, of the self-checks in this group use algorithms different from the 
original source code. 
121 Structural Checks: self-checks that verify the proper use of data structures or the proper 
semantics of code. Examples include a check which verifies that the exit condition of a 
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loop is true immediately following the loop and a check that verifies that data values have 
not been improperly overwritten. 
[3] Reversal Checks: self-checks that reverse the operation performed by the code and then see 
if the results are consistent with the input data. 
[4] Consistency Checks: self-checks that determine if the results have certain properties. 
Examples of consistency checks include range checking, arithmetic exception checking, and 
type checking. 
Table 1 shows the classification of the self-checks designed from the specification.' The 
participants labeled 3c and 8b did not provide specification-based self-checks. Note that the 
largest number of checks written were consistency checks followed by duplication checks. 
Performance is discussed later, but Tables 4 and 6 show that a total of 33 self-checks were * 
completely or partially effective in detecting errors. Of these 33 effective checks, 4 (or 12%) 
were formulated by the participants after looking at the requirements specification only. The 
remaining 88% of the effective checks were designed after the the participants had looked at the 
a 
code. Although it has been suggested [Anderson and Lee (198l)l that acceptance tests in the 
recovery block structure must be based on the specification alone, our results indicate that 
0 
effectiveness of the self-checks can be improved when the specification-based checks are refined 
and expanded by source code reading and a thorough and systematic instrumentation of the 
program. It appears that it is very useful for the instrumentor to actually see the code when 
writing self-checks. 
The second task of the participants was to instrument a particular program with self-checks. 
No limitations were placed on the participants as to how much time could be spent (although they 
order to aid the reader in referring to previously published descriptions of the faults found in the original LIP programs, the 
programs are referred to in this paper by the numbers previously assigned in the original experiment. A single letter suffix is added (a, 
b. or c) to distinguish between the three independent instrumentations of the programs. 
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Table 1: Specification-Based Self-checks 
were paid only for a 40 hour week which effectively set an upper bound t ) or how much code 
could be added. Table 2 describes the change in length in each program during instrumentation. 
Note that there is a great variation in the amount of code added, ranging from 48 lines to 835 
lines. Participants added an average of 37 self-checks, varying from 11 to 97. Despite this 
variation, there was no correlation between the total number of checks inserted by a participant 
and the number of those checks that were effective at finding faults. That is, more checks did not 
'Several reponed spending more than 40 houn on the project. 
*These self-checks were too vague to be classified 
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Version 
# 
3 
6 
8 
12 
14 
20 
23 
25 
necessarily mean better fault detection. 
Number of Lines Increase 
757 909 1152 805 152 395 48 
643 859 887 700 216 244 57 
600 1046 1356 824 446 756 224 
573 1121 696 806 548 123 233 
605 905 1342 712 300 737 107 
533 611 1368 596 78 835 63 
349 1065 417 544 716 68 195 
906 1644 1016 1022 738 110 116 
orirrinal a b c a b c 
e 
a 
e 
e 
0 
There was also no statistically significant relationship between the number of hours claimed 
to have been spent (as reported on the timesheets) by the participants and whether or not they 
detected any program faults. Table 3 shows the amount of time each participant spent reading the 
specification and code, developing self-checks based on that reading, implementing the self- 
checks and debugging the self-checks. The last two columns of the table describe the period of 
time over which this effort was expended. The “Days Active’’ column is the number of different 
dates which appeared on each participant’s time-sheet. The “Days Elapsed” column is the 
number of days between the first and last date on each time-sheet. Three participants (14a, 20a, 
and 25a) did not submit a time-sheet and are excluded from this table. 
Table 4 classifies the program-based self-checks in terms of strategy used and effectiveness. 
Checks are classified as effective if they correctly report the presence of an error during 
execution. Two partially effective checks by participant 23a that detect an error most (but not all) 
of the time are counted as effective. Ineffective checks are those that do not signal an error when 
one occurs during run-time in the module being checked. False alarms signal an error when no 
0 
Table 2: Lines of Code Added During Instrumentation 
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Table 3: Summary of Participant Time-Sheets 
error is present. Finally, the effectiveness is classified as unknown if the check does not signal an 
error and the module being tested is correct. 
It can be seen from Table 4 that duplication and consistency checks were about equally 
effective in detecting faults although more consistency checks were used. For these programs, 
structural and reversal checks were not effective, but this may have been influenced by the types 
of faults that were actually in the programs. We examined the ineffective self-checks (checks on 
code that contained faults but did not detect the faults) in detail. They appear to fail due to one or 
more of the following reasons: 
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m 
Effectives 
a
1 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
2 0 0  1 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
2 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
1 0 0  0 
2 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
1 0 0  8 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  2 
0 0 0  1 
2 * 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
7 0 0  2 
1 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
19 0 0 14 
0 
Unknowns 
D S R C  
2 19 0 8 
11 10 0 13 
0 11 0 0 
6 19 1 0 
0 19 0 34 
0 0 2  8 
13 0 0 0 
6 54 0 2 
3 1 0 10 
2 3 0 31 
0 0 0 17 
0 16 0 8 
0 1 1 56 
1 1 23 37 
0 0 1 15 
4 0 3  3 
12 0 0 80 
0 0 0 27 
9 0 0  0 
0 0 0 24 
0 0 0 30 
0 0 0 31 
1 4  0 0 6 
' 0 14 0 22 
173 168 31 462 
0 
Total 
33 
36 
14 
34 
82 
19 
15 
68 
19 
40 
22 
35 
63 
65 
17 
11 
99 
29 
11 
29 
32 
40 
11 
41 
865 e 
e 
e 
A= 
3a 
3b 
3c 
6a 
6b 
6c 
8a 
8b 
8c 
12a 
12b 
- 12c 
14a 
14b 
14c 
20a 
20b 
2oc 
23a 
23b 
23c 
25a 
25b 
25c 
Tota 
- 
- 
Ineffectives 
DSRCI 
1 2 0  0 
2 0 0  0 
0 3 0  0 
3 2 0  0 
0 12 0 16 
0 0 0  9 
0 0 0  0 
1 4 0  0 
1 0 0  0 
0 0 0  2 
0 0 0  5 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  5 
0 0 0  3 
0 0 0  1 
0 0 0  0 
2 0 0  1 
0 0 0  1 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  5 
0 0 0  2 
0 0 0  0 
0 0 0  0 
0 5 0  0 
10 28 0 50 
False Alarms 
w 
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 1 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 1 0 0  
2 0 0  1 
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0  
5 2 0 3  
Table 4: Self-check Classification 
0 Wrong self-check strategy - the participant used a type of self-check inappropriate to detect 
the fault present in the code. For example, use of a structural check when the fault was an 
inadvertent substitution of one variable for another in an expression. 
0 Wrong check placement - the participant placed the self-check in a location where not all 
results were checked, and the fault was on a different path. 
*These two checks were effective most, but not all. of the time. 
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0 Use of the original faulty code in the self-check - the participant falsely assumed a portion 
of the code was correct and called that code as part of the self-check. 
It should be noted that the placement of the checks may be as crucial as the content. This has 
important implications for future research in this area and for the use of self-checking in real 
applications. 
It should not be assumed that a false alarm involved a fault in the self-checks. In fact, there 
were cases where an error message was printed even though both the self-check and the original 
code were correct. This occurred when the self-check made a calculation using a different 
algorithm than the original code. Because of the inaccuracies introduced by finite precision 
arithmetic compounded by the difference in order of operations, the self-check algorithm 
sometimes produced a result which differed from the original by more than the allowed tolerance. 
Increasing the tolerance does not necessarily solve this problem in a desirable way. This same 
problem occurred in our previous experiment and is discussed in detail elsewhere [Brilliant, 
Knight, and Leveson (1986a)l. 
Some faults were detected while the participants were reading the code. The numbers in 
Table 5 refer to the numbering used to identify the individual faults in [Brilliant, Knight, and 
Leveson (1986b)J. Three faults were reported that actually were not faults; the participant 
misunderstood the code. 
Table 6 summarizes the detected faults by how they were found. 20% of the detected faults 
were dctected by specification-based checks, 40% by code-reading, and 40% by code-based 
checks. Note that often more than one check detected the same fault in the code-based case, 
which was not true of the specification-based or code-reading faults. 
0 
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6.2 
Object 
Faults Detected 
Effective Checks 
e 
Total Due To 
Smc-based Desim Code Reading Code-based Design 
4 8 8 20 
4 8 21 33 
e 
0 
e 
0 
e 
e 
Version Fault I*\ 
pi 
20.2 
Table 5: Faults Detected Through Code-Reading 
Table 6: Fault Detection Classified by Instrumentation Technique 
One final way of looking at the results of this study is to consider the number of faults 
detected and introduced by the participants. Table 7 shows this information. This data makes 
very clear the difficulty of writing effective self-checks. Of 20 previously known faults in the 
programs, only 11 were detected (the 14 detected known faults in Table 7 include some multiple 
detections of the same fault) and only 3 of the 11 detected faults were found by more than one of 
the three participants instrumenting the same program. It should be noted, however, that the 
versions used in the experiment are highly reliable (an average 99.9165% success rate on the 
previous one million case testing), and many of the faults are quite subtle. We could find no 
particular types of faults that were easier to detect than others. Individual differences in ability 
appear to be important here. 
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Already Known Faults # Other Faults 
3a 
3b 
3c 
6a 
6b 
6c 
8a 
8b 
8c 
12a 
12b 
12c 
14a 
14b 
14c 
20a 
20b 
2oc 
23a 
23b 
23c 
25a 
25b 
25c 
total 
Incorrect 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12 
NoAnswer 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
10 
Present 
4 
3 
Detected Detected 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
2 1 
0 0 
1 
3 I 1  2 1 0  
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 0 
2 0 
0 0 
0 1 
1 1 
0 0 
1 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 1 
1 0 
2 0 
0 0 
Newly Added Faults 
20 14 6 
Table 7: Summary of Error Detection 
One rather unusual case occurred. One of the new faults detected by participant 8c was 
detected quite by accident. There is a previously unknown fault in the program. However, the 
checking code contains the same fault. An error message is printed because the self-check code 
uses a different algorithm than the original, and finite precision problems cause the self-check to 
differ from the original by more than the allowed real-number tolerance. We discovered the new 
fault while evaluating the error messages printed, but it was entirely by chance. This same thing 
occurred in modules which did not contain a fault, and in that case the error message was 
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classified as a false alarm (as discussed above). Our decision was to classify the self-check as 
effective because it does signal a fault when a fault does exist, but this is a subjective choice. 
It is very interesting that the self-checks detected 6 faults not previously detected by 
comparison of twenty-seven versions of the program with a gold version over a million test cases. 
After closer examination of the newly discovered faults, we found that one of the reasons they 
were not uncovered previously is that the strategy of test case selection did not include those test 
cases that would have revealed the faults. This points out the well-known difficulty in selecting 
appropriate test cases. The fact that the self-checks uncovered new faults implies that they may 
have some advantages over voting alone. To understand why, it is instructive to examine an 
example of one of the previously undetected faults. 
Some algorithms are unstable under a few conditions. More specifically, several 
mathematically valid formulae to compute the area of a triangle are not equally reliable when 
implemented using finite precision arithmetic. In particular, the use of Heron’s formula: 
area =&* (s-a >* (s -b >* (s -c ) 
where a ,  b , and c are the distances between the three points and s is (a +b +c)/2, fails in the 
rare case when all the following conditions are met simultaneously: 
Three points are almost co-linear (but not exactly). s will then be extremely close to one of 
the distances, say a ,  so that (s-a) will introduce round-off errors (around in the 
hardware employed in this experiment). 
The product of the rest of the terms, s* (s -b )* (s -c ), is large enough (approximately lo4) 
to make rounding errors significant through multiplication (approximately 10-l2). 
The area formed by taking the square root is slightly larger than the real number 
comparison tolerance ( lod6 in our example) so that the area is not considered zero. 
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area = 
where xi and yi are the coordinates of the three points, did not fail since the potential roundoff 
errors cannot become “significant” due to the order of operations. 2 of the 6 previously 
unknown faults detected involved the use of Heron’s formula. Since the source of the 
unreliability is in the order of computation and inherent in the formula, relaxing the real number 
comparison tolerance will not prevent this problem. The fault in Heron’s formula was not 
detected during the previous testing since the voting procedure compared the final result only, 
whereas the self-check verified the validity of the intermediate results as well. For the few cases 
in which it arose, the faults did not affect the correctness of the final output. However, under 
different circumstances the final output would have been incorrect, 
Although new faults were introduced through the self-checks, this is not very surprising. It 
is known that changing someone else’s program is difficult and whenever new code is added to a 
program there is a possibility of introducing faults. All software fault tolerance methods involve 
adding additional code of one kind or another to the basic application program. The major causes 
of the new faults were an algorithmic error in a redundant computation, use of an uninitialized 
variable during instrumentation, logic error, use of Heron’s formula, infinite loops added in 
instrumentation, out of bounds array reference, etc. The use of uninitialized variables occurred 
due to incomplete program instrumentation. A participant would declare a temporary variable to 
hold an intermediate value during the computation, but fail to assign a value on some path 
through the computation. A rigorous acceptance test may have detected these faults earlier, 
especially those that cause an abnormal termination of the program. 
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This study was not designed to provide definitive answers to any particular questions, but 
instead to attempt to determine what the important questions are. This should guide us and others 
in the design of further experiments, in the evaluation of current proposals, and in the design of 
new methodologies. Some important questions arise as a result of this study that need to be 
answered such as: 
[ 13 There appear to be great differences in individual ability to design effective self-checks. 
This suggests that more training or experience might be helpful. Our participants had little 
of either although all were familiar with the use of pre- and post-conditions and assertions 
to formally verify programs. The data suggests that it might also be interesting to 
investigate the use of teams to instrument code. 
[2] The programs were instrumented with self-checks in our study by participants who did not 
write the original code. It would be interesting to compare this with instrumentation by the 
original programmer. A reasonable argument could be made both ways. The original 
programmer, who presumably understands the code better, might introduce fewer new 
faults and might be better able to place the checks. On the other hand, separate 
instrumentors might be more likely to detect faults since they provide a new view of the 
problem. More comparative data is needed here. 
[3] Placement of self-checks appeared to cause problems. Some checks that might have been 
effective failed to detect a fault because they were badly placed. This implies either a need 
for better decision-making and rules for placing checks or perhaps different software design 
techniques to make placement easier. 
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[4] Specification-based checks alone were not as effective as using them together with code- 
based checks. This implies that fault tolerance may be enhanced if the alternate blocks in a 
recovery block scheme, for example, are also augmented with self-checks along with the 
usual acceptance test. This may also apply to pure voting schemes such as N-version 
programming. A combination of fault-tolerance techniques may be more effective than any 
one alone. More information is needed on how best to integrate these different proposals. 
[5] The process of writing self-checks is obviously difficult. However, there may be ways to 
provide help with this process. For example, Leveson and Shimeall (1983) suggest that 
safety analysis using software fault trees (Leveson and Harvey) can be used to determine 
the content and the placement of the most important self-checks. Other types of application 
or program analysis may also be of assistance. Finally, empirical data about common fault 
types may be important in learning how to instrument code with self-checks. 
Many promising research topics, empirical studies, and experiments are suggested by the results 
of this study that may lead to better procedures for software error detection. 
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APPENDIX B 
0 
a 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF TESTING THE RSDIMU PROGRAMS 
UNDER BENIGN CONDITIONS 
e 
0 
0 
e 
e 
- 4 4 -  
e 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
a 
The tests cases that were executed to produce the results described here are termed benign 
because they represent normal operational conditions for the programs. Low levels of 
residual noise were used and no sensor failures were introduced. Very high reliability 
would be expected from the programs under these circumstances. 
A series of fifteen simulated flights of lo00 acceleration values each were run on 17 of the 
20 versions. The three that were not run had too many problems to be of any use (too many 
runtime failures, no correct responses, corrected version not available). The sensor face 
temperature and residual noise level were varied systematically. Three different temperature 
values and five residual noise values were used. The temperatures were 5, 10, and 15 degrees 
Celsius. In all cases, the residual noise was generated by sampling from a uniform distribution t . 
The five uniform distribution ranges were 0, e, f4 ,  f6 ,  and f8. Listed below are the values of 
the other parameters: 
Number of Accel Values 
Random Number Seeds 
Noise std dev 
Display mode 
Scale0 
Scale1 
Scale2 
Misalign angles 
Nsigt 
Phi1 
ThetaI 
1000 
2839573257346274 
fixed at 20 
fixed at 88 
fixed at 3.5660e+OO 
fixed at 1.3585e-02 
fixed at 2.7169e-05 
random betw -1.0000e-01 and 1.0000e-01 
fixed at 4 
random betw 0.0000e+00 and 3.6000e+02 
random betw 0.0000e+00 and 3.6000e+02 
tIt is understood that the uniform distribution is unrealistic. This distribution was used merely to allow preliminary evaluation 
of the programs and detailed debugging of the testing environment. 
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a 
a 
Psi1 random betw 0.0000e+00 and 3.6000e+02 
a 
a 
a 
0 
a 
a 
The results were compared with a gold program (v2.1 provided by NCSU). In order to be 
considered correct, a version had to agree with the gold on operational status, and if that status 
was Operational or Analytical, had to agree within a specific tolerance to each of the “X”, “Y” 
and “2” components of estimated acceleration. Tolerances were relative except when close to 
zero, when an absolute tolerance (called delta) was used. The versions were compared to the gold 
using three sets of tolerances: 
Tolerance Inner Limit Around Zero Delta(Abso1ute Tolerance) 
0.00 10 0.0010 0.0001 
0.0050 0.0050 0.0005 
0.0100 0.0100 0.0010 
The individual probabilities of correct responses, the number of times and the number of 
versions that failed simultaneously, and the number of times that versions produced the same 
wrong results were computed for each of the three tested tolerances. Fourteen versions 
performed perfectly under all testing conditions at all tolerances tested. One version performed 
perfectly under conditions of no noise, and abysmally when any noise was introduced. The other 
two versions had a very high rate of identical failure. It is interesting to note that these two 
versions were produced at different universities, yet failed identically so often. 
The detailed results of all the tests follow. 
a 
a 
e 
e 
0 
e 
RunNl/RunTl: 
Noise Val: f i x e d  a t  0 
T e m p s :  fixed a t  5.0000e+00 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6770 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6810 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9622 
Number of  s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 670 67.00 
1 18 1.80 
2 312 31.20 
0 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
e 
0 
0 
2 289 
3 0 
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/. 
lo 
le 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 0 5 0  
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 0 5 0  
de l ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 5  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H :  
J: 
K:  
L :  
M: 
N:  
0: 
P :  
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9610 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9620 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9955 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 961 96.10 
1 1 0 . 1 0  
2 3 8  3 . 8 0  
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 3 8  
3 0 
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0 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P:  
Q: 
R: 
T:  
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9950 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9940 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9994 
N u m b e r  of  s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 994 99.40 
1 1 0.10 
2 5 0.50 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 5 
3 0 
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RunNl /RunTz :  
N o i s e  V a l :  fixed a t  0 
Temps :  fixed a t  1 . 5 0 0 0 e + 0 1  
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
I n n e r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P :  
Q: 
R: 
T:  
Average : 
€ o r  s i n g l e  vers ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 6 7 8 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 6 7 3 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 9 6 1 8  
Number of s i m u l t a n e o u s  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  # o c c u r .  % 
0 6 6 5  6 6 . 5 0  
1 2 1  2 .10  
2 3 1 4  3 1 . 4 0  
Number of ident ical  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
# v e r s i o n s  #occur. 
2 2 8 6  
3 0 
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0 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
d e l t a  = 0.0005 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions  : 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9590 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9610 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9953 
N u m b e r  of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 959 95.90 
1 2 0.20 
2 39 3.90 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 39 
3 0 
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e 
0 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
de l ta  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L :  
M: 
N: 
0: 
P :  
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9960 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9960 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9995 
N u m b e r  of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 996 99.60 
1 0 0.00 
2 4 0.40 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  v e r s i o n  failures: 
#ver s ions  #occur .  
2 4 
3 0 
e 
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e 
a 
RunNl/RunT3: 
Noise Val: f i x e d  a t  0 
Temps: f i x e d  a t  2.5000e+01 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
delta = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0 :  
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.6680 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6700 
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 9 6 1 1  
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 659 65.90 
1 20 2 . 0 0  
2 321 32.10 
N u m b e r  of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 293 
3 0 
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0 
0 
0 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
del ta  = 0.0005 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9610 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9650 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9956 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 961 96.10 
1 4 0.40 
2 35 3.50 
N u m b e r  of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 35 
3 0 
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0 
e 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9940 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 f 0000 
0.9950 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9994 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 994 99.40 
1 1 0.10 
2 5 0.50 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 5 
3 0 
a 
e 
a 
0 
a 
e 
RunNZ/RunTl 
Noise Val: random betw -2 and '2 
Temps: fixed at 5.0000e+00 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6820 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6820 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9038 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 672 67.20 
2 20 2.00 
3 308 30.80 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 288 
3 0 
e 
- 5 6 -  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D:  
E :  
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0040 
0.9620 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9630 
1.0000 
I. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9370 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 4 0.40 
1 957 95.70 
2 3 0.30 
3 36 3.60 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 36 
3 0 
* 
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e 
e 
e 
a 
e 
0 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0100  
d e l t a  = 0 .0010  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.1560 
0.9910 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9910 
1 * 0000 
1. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9493 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s  : 
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 156 15.60 
1 835 83.50 
2 0 0.00 
3 9 0.90 
N u m b e r  of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 9 
3 0 
a 
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e 
a 
a 
e 
e 
RunN2/RunT2 
Noise Val: random betw -2 and 2 
Temps: fixed at 1.5000e+01 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6800 
1.0000 
1.0000 
i. i10Uu 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6760 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9033 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 666 66.60 
2 24 2.40 
3 310 3 1 . 0 0  
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 288 
3 0 
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e 
* 
0 
0 
e 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D :  
E :  
F: 
H :  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P:  
Q: 
T:  
Average : 
0 .  
.K: 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 5  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 f 0000 
1.0000 
0.0030 
0.9630 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9650 
1.0000 
i. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9371 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 3 0.30 
1 958 95.80 
2 6 0.60 
3 33 3.30 
N u m b e r  of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 33 
3 0 
e 
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e 
e 
e 
e 
0 
e 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D :  
E :  
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L: 
M: 
N :  
0: 
P :  
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 .0100  
del ta  = 0 .0010  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 f 0000 
0.1410 
0.9910 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9910 
1.0000 
i. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9484 
Number of simultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 141 14.10 
1 850 85.00 
2 0 0.00 
3 9 0.90 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 9 
3 0 
e 
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a 
a 
e 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
a 
a 
e 
RunN2/RunT3 
N o i s e  V a l :  random b e t w  -2 and 2 
T e m p s :  f ixed a t  2 .5000e+01 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
I n n e r  L i m i t  = 0 .0010  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
p ( S u c c e s s )  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F :  
H:  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
f o r  s i n g l e  versions: 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6700 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6680 
1 .0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9022 
N u m b e r  of s i m u l t a n e o u s  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  # o c c u r .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 658 65.80 
2 2 2  2 .20  
3 320 32.00 
N u m b e r  of ident ical  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
# v e r s i o n s  # o c c u r .  
2 2 97 
3 0 
-62- 
e 
e 
e 
p (Success 1 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F:  
H :  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N:  
0: 
P :  
Q: 
K: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 0 5  
f o r  s i n g l e  v e r s i o n s  : 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1 * 0000 
0.0010 
0.9620 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9640 
1.0000 
i. 0000 
1 * 0000 
0.9369 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 1 0.10 
1 961 96.10 
2 2 0.20 
3 36 3.60 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 36 
3 0 
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p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D:  
E: 
F: 
H:  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
d e l t a  = 0.0010 
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.1250 
0.9920 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9920 
1.0000 
i. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9476 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  Z 
0 125 12.50 
1 867 86.70 
2 0 0.00 
3 8 0.80 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  version f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 8 
3 0 
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e 
e 
0 
0 
e 
e 
RunN3/RunT1 
Noise Val: random betw -4 and 4 
Temps: fixed at 5.0000e+00 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 .0000  
0.6850 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
i. 0000 
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1.0000 
0.6860 
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1 f 0000  
.O .9042 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 672 67.20 
2 27 2.70 
3 301 30.10 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 287 
3 0 
-65 - 
e 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9570 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9620 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9364 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 957 95.70 
2 5 0.50 
3 38 3.80 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 38 
3 0 
-66 -  
a 
0 
c 
0 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D:  
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
del ta  = 0.0010 
for s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0 .0700  
0.9890 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9900 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9441 
Number of  s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 69 6.90 
1 920 92-00 
2 2 0.20 
3 9 0.90 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 10 
3 0 
a 
-67 - 
Q 
RunN3/RunT2 
Noise Val: random betw -4 and 4 
Temps: fixed at 1.5000e+01 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6850 
1.0000 
1.0000 
i. uuuu 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6810 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9039 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 671 67.10 
2 2 4  2.40 
3 305 30.50 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 289 
3 0 
- 68 - 
e 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N:  
0: 
P:  
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9580 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9620 
1.0000 
i. 0000 
1.0000 
0.9365 
Number of  s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 958 95.80 
2 4 0.40 
3 38 3.80 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
c 
2 38 
3 0 
- 6 9 -  
a 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner Limit = 0.0100 
delta = 0.0010 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0610 
0.9920 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
I. 0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9920 
1.0000 
i.0000 
1.0000 
0.9438 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 60 6.00 
1 932 93.20 
2 1 0.10 
3 7 0.70 
Number of identical version f a i l u r e s :  
#versions #occur. 
2 8 
3 0 
-70-  
0 
RunN3/RunT3 
Noise Val: random betw -4 and 4 
Temps: fixed at 2.5000e+01 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6770 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6810 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9034 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. 8 
0 0 0.00 
1 668 66.80 
2 22 2.20 
3 310 31.00 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 2 94 
3 0 
-71 - 
a 
0 
0 
0 
TOLERANCE = 0 .0050  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
p(Success1 f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
A: 1.0000 
B: 1.0000 
c: 1.0000 
D: 1.0000 
E: 0.0000 
F: 0.9650 
H: 1.0000 
J: 1.0000 
K: 1.0000 
L: 1.0000 
M: 1.0000 
N: 1.0000 
0: 1.0000 
P: 0.9690 
Q: 1.0000 
R: i.OOOO 
T: 1.0000 
Average : 0.9373 
Number of s imul taneous  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 965 96.50 
2 4 0.40 
3 31 3.10 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  failures: 
#ver s ions  #occur.  
2 31 
3 0 
-72 - 
0 
e 
e 
0 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
p (Success)  f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
A: 1.0000 
B: 1.0000 
c :  1 . 0 0 0 0  
D:  1 . 0 0 0 0  
E :  0.0560 
F: 0.9920 
H: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
J: 1.0000 
K: 1.0000 
L: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
M: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
N: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
0: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
P: 0.9920 
Q: 1.0000 
Rt i . 0 0 0 0  
T: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
Average : 0.9435 
Number of simultaneoi 
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 56 5.60 
1 936 93.60 
2 0 0.00 
3 8 0.80 
s ver s ion  f a i l u r e  
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
i :  
2 8 
3 0 
-73 - 
e 
0 
0 
0 
RunNI/RunTl 
N o i s e  V a l :  random b e t w  -6 and 6 
T e m p s :  fixed a t  5.0000e+00 
p ( S u c c e s s )  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D :  
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N:  
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
I n n e r  L i m i t  = 0 .0010  
de l ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
f o r  s i n g l e  v e r s i o n s :  
1 .0000  
1 .0000 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0 . 0 0 0 0  
0 .6870 
1 .0000  
1 .0000 
i. 0000  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0.6890 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.9045 
Number of s i m u l t a n e o u s  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  # o c c u r .  % 
0 0 0 . 0 0  
1 680 68.00 
2 1 6  1 . 6 0  
3 304 30.40 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
# v e r s i o n s  # o c c u r .  
2 287 
3 0 
- 7 4 -  
0 
e 
e 
0 
e 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 5  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9680 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9690 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9375 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 968 96.80 
2 1 0.10 
3 31 3.10 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 31 
3 0 
8 
-75 - 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D :  
E: 
F: 
H:  
J: 
K :  
L :  
M: 
N: 
0: 
P :  
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.0300 
0 . 9 9 4 0  
1 .0000  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 9 9 4 0  
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0 . 9 4 2 2  
N u m b e r  of  s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 30 3 .00  
1 9 6 4  9 6 . 4 0  
2 0 0.00 
3 6 0 .60  
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 6 
3 0 
- 76 - 
e 
0 
I 
I 
c 
RunN4/RunT2 
Noise Val: random betw -6 and 6 
Temps: fixed at 1.5000e+01 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6900 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6910 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9048 
Number of simultaneous version fail1 
Failures #occur. % 
res 
0 0 0.00 
1 679 67.90 
2 23 2.30 
3 298 29.80 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur.  
2 280 
3 0 
- 77 - 
a 
0 
0 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P:  
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
de l ta  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0 0  
0.9750 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.9750 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0.9382 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0 .00  
1 975 97.50 
2 0 0 .00  
3 25 2.50 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 25 
3 0 
e 
-78-  
0 
e 
e 
A: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
B: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
c :  1.0000 
D: 1.0000 
E: 0.0280 
F: 0.9950 
H: 1 .0000  
J: 1.0000 
K: 1.0000 
L: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
M: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
N: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
0: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
P: 0.9950 
Q: 1 .0000  
R: 1.0000 
T: 1.0000 
Average : 0.9422 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
p (Success)  f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
r s ion  f Number of s imultaneous v 
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 28 2.80 
1 967 96.70 
2 0 0.00 
3 5 0.50 
i l u r e s  : 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 5 
3 0 
- 7 9 -  
e 
e 
0 
0 
e 
RunN4/RunT3 
Noise V a l :  random b e t w  -6 and 6 
T e m p s :  f ixed a t  2 .5000e+01 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner L i m i t  = 0 .0010  
del ta  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
p ( S u c c e s s )  f o r  s i n g l e  vers ions:  
A: 1.0000 
B: 1.0000 
c: 1.0000 
D: 1.0000 
E: 0.0000 
F: 0.6890 
H: 1.0000 
J: 1.0000 
K: 1.0000 
L: 1.0000 
M: 1.0000 
N: 1.0000 
0: 1.0000 
P: 0.6880 
Q: 1.0000 
R: 1.0000 
T: 1.0000 
Average: 0 .9045 
Number of simultaneous v - r s i o n  f 
F a i l u r e s  # o c c u r .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 677 67.70 
2 23 2.30 
3 300 30.00 
i l u r e s  : 
Number of i den t i ca l  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
# v e r s i o n s  # o c c u r .  
2 285  
3 0 
- 8 0 -  
e 
a 
0 
e 
a 
a 
a 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E :  
F: 
H:  
J: 
K:  
L :  
M: 
N: 
0: 
P :  
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0050 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0.0050 
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
for s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9710 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9700 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9377 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 969 96.90 
2 3 0.30 
3 28 2.80 
N u m b e r  of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 28 
3 0 
e 
-81 - 
0 
e 
0 
0 
e 
TOLERANCE = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
d e l t a  = 0 .0010  
p (Success 1 for s i n g l e  v e r s i o n s  : 
A: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
B: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
c :  1.0000 
D: 1.0000 
E: 0.0190 
F: 0.9940 
H: 1.0000 
J: 1.0000 
K: 1.0000 
L: 1.0000 
M: 1.0000 
N: 1.0000 
0: 1 . 0 0 0 0  
P: 0.9950 
Q: 1.0000 
R: 1.0000 
T: 1.0000 
Average: 0.9416 
Number of simultaneoi 
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 19 1.90 
1 975 97.50 
2 1 0.10 
3 5 0.50 
s v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s  
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 5 
3 0 
e 
a 
- 8 2 -  
a 
a 
a 
a 
RunNS/RunTl 
Noise V a l :  random b e t w  -8 and 8 
Temps: f i x e d  a t  5.0000e+00 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L: 
M: 
N:  
0: 
I?: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0.0010 
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 0 1  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6900 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6830 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9043 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 676 67.60 
2 21 2.10 
3 303 30.30 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 285 
3 0 
a 
-83 - 
a 
a 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D:  
E: 
F: 
H :  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P :  
Q:  
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0 .0050  
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9650 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9680 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9372 
Number of  s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 965 96.50 
2 3 0.30 
3 32 3.20 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 32 
3 0 
-84 -  
a 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner Limit = 0.0100 
delta = 0.0010 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0260 
0.9950 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9950 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9421 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 26 2.60 
1 969 96.90 
2 0 0.00 
3 5 0.50 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 5 
3 0 
e 
-85 - 
0 
0 
0 
RunNS/RunT2 
Noise Val: random betw -8 and 8 
Temps: fixed at 1.5000e+01 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0 :  
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6830 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6840 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9039 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 673 67.30 
2 21 2.10 
3 306 30.60 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 287 
3 0 
- 86 - 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K :  
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P:  
Q: 
R: 
T:  
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0 .0050  
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 .0005  
f o r  s i n g l e  v e r s i o n s  : 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
0 .0000  
0.9700 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0 .9680  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 .0000  
1 .0000  
0.9375 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0 .00  
1 968 96.80 
2 2 0.20 
3 3 0  3 .00  
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 3 0  
3 0 
a 
a 
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a 
e 
a 
e 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L :  
M: 
N:  
0: 
P :  
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 .0100  
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 1 0  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0230 
0.9940 
1 .0000  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9950 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9419 
Number of s imultaneous v e r s i o n  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur.  % 
0 23  2.30 
1 971 97.10 
2 1 0.10 
3 5 0.50 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s  : 
#ver s ions  #occur .  
2 5 
3 0 
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e 
RunN5/RunT3 
Noise Val: random betw -8 and 8 
Temps: fixed at 2.5000e+01 
p (Success) 
A: 
B: 
C: 
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0.0010 
Inner Limit = 0.0010 
delta = 0.0001 
for single versions: 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.6790 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.6760 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9032 
Number of simultaneous version failures: 
Failures #occur. % 
0 0 0.00 
1 670 67.00 
2 15 1.50 
3 315 31.50 
Number of identical version failures: 
#versions #occur. 
2 2 92 
3 0 
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a 
a 
a 
0 
p (Success)  
A: 
B: 
C :  
D: 
E: 
F: 
H: 
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N: 
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
TOLERANCE = 0 .0050  
Inne r  L i m i t  = 0 .0050  
d e l t a  = 0 . 0 0 0 5  
f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.9660 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9690 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9374 
Number of s imultaneous ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
0 0 0.00 
1 966 96.60 
2 3 0.30 
3 31 3.10 
Number of i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur .  
2 31 
3 0 
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e 
0 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
TOLERANCE = 0.0100 
Inner  L i m i t  = 0 . 0 1 0 0  
d e l t a  = 0.0010 
p (Success)  f o r  s i n g l e  ve r s ions :  
A: 
B: 
C:  
D: 
E :  
F: 
H:  
J: 
K: 
L: 
M: 
N:  
0: 
P: 
Q: 
R: 
T: 
Average : 
Number of  
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0190 
0.9910 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9920 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9413 
s imu 1 tanec 
F a i l u r e s  #occur .  % 
s ver s ion  f a i l u r e  
0 19 1.90 
1 972 97.20 
2 1 0.10 
3 8 0.80 
Number of  i d e n t i c a l  ve r s ion  f a i l u r e s :  
#ve r s ions  #occur.  
2 8 
3 0 
i :  
e 
e 
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